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Abstract
With informational frictions on the labor market, hedonic wage regressions
provide biased estimates of the willingness to pay for job attributes. We
show that a recent theoretical result, which states that variation in job
durations does provide good estimates in case of a basic on-the-job search
model, can be generalized to a wide class of search models. We apply this
result by estimating the marginal willingness of employed workers to pay
for commuting, using Dutch longitudinal data. The average willingness to
pay for one hour commuting is estimated to equal almost half of the hourly
wage rate.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to estimate the marginal willingness of employed workers
to pay for commuting. There has grown a general interest in the topic of compens-
ation for commutes. Unit commuting costs may be an important determinant of
worker behavior. If they are high, then the individual may prefer to reject an offer
of a far-away job in favor of a job around the corner even if the former job offers
a much higher wage. In that case these costs may affect the allocation process on
the labor market. Information on the willingness to pay for commuting distance
may help to evaluate policy measures aiming at the abatement of commuting. For
example, the direct cost of an additional time unit of commuting due to increased
traffic congestion can be calculated.
Usually, the marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for commuting (or for other
non-wage job attributes) is estimated by way of hedonic wage regressions (see for
example Zax, 1991). This is a natural approach in the context of static or long-run
equilibrium models in which markets are assumed to be perfect. In the context
of urban economics, the standard monocentric urban residential-location theory
implies that wages need to decline with distance from the central business dis-
trict, to compensate workers located at suburban places for commuting expenses
(see, e.g., McDonald, 1997). According to this theory, a labor-market equilibrium
locus of wages and commuting times exists, the gradient of the hedonic wage
function equals the marginal willingness to pay for commuting time, and these
can be estimated directly from the observed relation between commuting time
and wages (see Madden, 1995, for an example of an empirical study). The urban
theory also implies that workers are (partly) compensated on the housing market
for commutes from distant suburbs, because housing prices are lower at higher
distances from the central business district.
Gronberg and Reed (1994) and Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) show that
estimates obtained from hedonic regressions are likely to be biased if the labor
market is characterized by informational frictions. In such markets, firms with
a high innate labor productivity offer higher wages as well as better values of
the non-wage characteristics, in equilibrium. To the extent that productivity is
unobserved, a regression of wages on other characteristics gives bad estimates of
the marginal willingness to pay for those characteristics.’ In the context of com-
muting distance, high productivity firms may have a denser net of work locations
or they may enable their employees to work at home more often.
‘Employing simulated data derived from a rather specific equilibrium search model, Gron-
berg and Reed (1994) conclude that “the conventional hedonic method generates a MWP
estimate that is approximately one-fourth of its true value”.
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In response to this, Gronberg and Reed (1994) develop a different estimation
method for the willingness to pay for job attributes. The starting point in their
approach is that workers search on the job in a market with informational fric-
tions. The estimation method exploits the fact that the utility trade-off between
the wage and other job attributes is reflected in job duration differences. Spe-
cifically, for a basic on-the-job search model, Gronberg and Reed (1994) show
that if the job exit rate is much more sensitive to a certain job attribute than to
the wage, then this means that the willingness to pay for that attribute is large
in absolute value. This approach is not sensitive to the presence of unobserved
firm characteristics. Moreover, it is very attractive from a computational point
of view, since it suffices to estimate a reduced-form job duration model to estim-
ate the willingness to pay. Note that the latter is a structural parameter as it
concerns a characteristic of the instantaneous utility function of the workers.2
During the past decades, the search approach has proven to be an useful tool
to analyze labor market dynamics in many respects. In empirical work, the focus
has been on the determinants of the minimum acceptable wage that induces an
individual to accept a job offer (the reservation wage) and the durations of un-
employment and jobs. Recently, it has been stressed that “much more attention
should also be paid to nonwage  characteristics” (Devine and Kiefer, 1993, in their
survey on job search). Such non-wage characteristics have mostly been neglected
in structural empirical analyses of search models. A noticeable exception concerns
Blau (1991) who estimates a job search model with different wage/hours combin-
ations. More recently, Van den Berg and Gorter (1997) analyze a job search model
for unemployed individuals that allows jobs to have different wage/commuting-
time combinations. In that paper, the structural parameter of interest is the utility
trade-off between the wage and commuting time, or in other words the willing-
2The general notion that job exits are informative on the workers’ willingness to pay for a job
attribute has some history. Bartel(l982) studies the effects of the wage and non-wage character-
istics on quit decisions, and argues that these effects are informative on the “relative values” (or
“relative importance”) of the job characteristics for the worker. Herzog and Schlottmann (1990)
estimate the effects of the wage and the risk in the workplace on the likelihood that the worker
switches to another industry, and they claim that this can be used to assess the willingness to
pay for risk reduction. They also argue that the latter may differ from the hedonic (market)
price of risk if the labor market is imperfect. However, they do not examine a formal behavioral
model for the switching rate. Bartik, Butler and Liu (1992) provide a similar analysis for the
housing market, estimating the willingness to pay for neighborhood amenities from residential
mobility behavior. See Herzog and Schlottmann (1990) for a listing of other previous literature
concerned with the idea that quits are informative on the willingness to pay for attributes. It
is interesting to note that the previous empirical studies always find that the estimate of the
trade-off between money and other attributes that is based on hedonic regressions is smaller in
absolute value than the estimate based on mobility behavior.
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ness of unemployed workers to pay for commuting. It is estimated by comparing
subjective responses on reservation wages for different job types.
In this paper we apply the approach by Gronberg and Reed (1994) to estimate
the marginal willingness to pay for commuting. We use a Dutch dataset  that
contains information on job durations, job-to-job transitions, and commuting
distances of employed workers. In addition to this, in this paper, we generalize
the theoretical analysis by Gronberg and Reed (1994) by examining less restrictive
dynamic on-the-job search models. We also provide intuition on why the approach
cannot be applied in a few particular model extensions.
Section 2 of this paper contains the theoretical analysis. In Section 3 we apply
our method to estimate the marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for commuting
distance, using information on voluntary job-to-job transitions.3  We compare
the estimates with those from a static hedonic wage regression. Finally, some
concluding remarks are made in Section 4.
2 Search theory and the relation between job
durations and willingness to pay for job at-
tributes
2.1 The basic on-the-job search model
In this section we examine search models for job-to-job transitions when jobs are
characterized by a wage w and a second job attribute x. The formal results do
not depend on a specific interpretation of x. However, given the focus of this
paper, we will mostly interpret x as the commuting distance, and we will restrict
attention to model specifications that make sense under this interpretation of x.
We are particularly interested in the relation between the ratio of the deriv-
atives of the job exit rate 0 with respect to w and x on the one hand, and the
ratio of the derivatives of the instantaneous utility flow function u with respect
to w and IC on the other. It has been derived before that in a basic on-the-job
search model these ratios are equal to each other (Gronberg and Reed, 1994),
dfqw,  x)/ax du(w,  x)/ax
aqw,  xpw = du(w, x)/dw (1)
3An  alternative strategy would be to estimate a full structural model for on-the-job search,
allowing jobs to have multiple attributes. This would be a formidable task, and, as mentioned
above, it is not necessary in order to structurally estimate the MWP.
By definition, the right-hand side of this expression is the marginal willingness to
pay for the job attribute z. This is a characteristic of the instantaneous utility flow
function u, and as such it is an interesting structural determinant of behavior. The
left-hand side of (1) is a quantity that is easily estimated from job duration data.
Clearly, therefore, the equality of these ratios enables straightforward estimation
of the marginal willingness to pay for x.
We start with a brief description of the basic on-the-job search model. We
then generalize this model and examine whether (1) still holds. The theory of
on-the-job search aims at describing the behavior of employed individuals who
search for a better job (see Mortensen, 1986, and Albrecht, Holmlund and Lang,
1991, for overviews). Consider the basic on-the-job search model extended to
allow for non-wage characteristics x, as sketched by Gronberg and Reed (1994).
Suppose an individual has a job with characteristics w, x. Offers of new jobs arrive
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate X.  Such job offers are random
drawings (without recall) from the joint distribution of net wages w* and job
characteristics x*,  with distribution function F(w*,  x*).  We assume that all jobs
are full-time jobs. During employment, exogenous separations occur at the rate
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Note that we do not assume a parametric functional form for the offer dis-
tribution of x*.  In particular, if x* denotes commuting distance then we allow
these to be non-uniformly distributed over space. For example, for an individual
living in a village, most job offers may originate from a nearby larger town, so
they will have approximately the same commuting distance. We also allow the
wage offer to be dependent on the corresponding offer of x*.  For example, in case
x* denotes commuting distance, one may live close to a few small firms offer-
ing low wages and far from a town with large firms offering higher wages. Also,
firms may provide financial compensation for commuting costs, and the amount
of compensation may be increasing in the commuting distance. The latter would
establish a positive association between w and x. We do however require that the
dependence between w and x is not deterministic, and that they are continuously
distributed.4
Every time an offer arrives the decision has to be made whether to accept
it or to reject it and search further. Individuals aim at maximization of their
expected present value of utility over an infinite horizon. We assume that utility
is intertemporally separable. The instantaneous utility flow equals U(W,  x) in case
one works in a job with characteristics ‘w,  x.
Individuals are assumed to know X  and F(w*,  x*). However, they do not know
4The continuity assumption is made for notational convenience. If z is discrete (e.g. a dummy
variable) then derivatives with respect to x should be replaced by differences.
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in advance when job offers arrive, or which W*  and x* are associated with them.
We assume that the model is stationary. This means that w,  x, X  and F(w*,  x*)
are assumed to be independent of the duration of being in the present job and
independent of all events during the stay in the present job. Further, X  and the
function F are not allowed to depend on w or x, and they are assumed to be the
same in every job.
For future comparisons, it is useful to present for this model the Bellman
equation for the expected present value of utility R(w,  x) of someone who works
in a job with characteristics w,x.  Throughout this section, for convenience, we
avoid technicalities and assume regularity conditions to hold. Let p be the rate
of discount and let U be the expected present value of being unemployed. Using
the familiar returns-to-assets representation of Bellman’s equation (see e.g. Van
den Berg, 1990),  we have
pR(w,X)  = u(w,x) +X~WJommax{O,R(w*,x’ I) - R(w,  x) }dF(w*,  x*) + S(U  - R(w,  x))
(2)
This equation can be understood by interpreting R(w,  x) as an asset for which the
return flow equals the flow of what one expects to get from holding the asset. The
latter consists of three parts: (i) the instantaneous utility flow, (ii) the job offer
arrival rate times the expected gain from finding another job, and (iii) the rate at
which a separation arrives times the expected loss of such an event. From equation
(2),  the individual accepts a job offer if and only if R(w*,  x*) - R(w,  x) > 0.
It is well known that in this model, the optimal strategy of employed indi-
viduals can be characterized by a reservation utility level u(w,  x). A job offer
(w*,  x*)  is acceptable if and only if the instantaneous utility flow u(w*, x*)  asso-
ciated with it exceeds the reservation utility level u(w,  x) (the optimal strategy
is “myopic”). Basically, this is because, by accepting an offer, nothing changes
except for the increase in the instantaneous utility flow. In other words, no op-
tions are thrown away by accepting an offer, and no sunk transition costs are
made either. The choice set remains the same when accepting an offer, in the
sense that one is always able to return to the previous situation by throwing
away part of one’s instantaneous utility flow. (Note for future reference that in
this model the inequality R(w*,  x*)  > R(w,  x) is thus equivalent to the inequality
u(w*, x*>  > u(w,  x).)
The exit rate e(w,x)  out of the present job is the sum of the exit rates to the
two different destination states. The exit rate to unemployment equals 6. The
exit rate to other jobs equals the product of the job offer arrival rate and the
5
probability that the offer is acceptable. Let S(zu, z) denote the set of acceptable
job offers, i.e.
G(w,x)  = {w*,x*~u(w*,x*)  > u(w,x)} (3)
Note that G(w, z) depends on w, x solely by way of U(W,  x). There holds that
B(w,x) = s+x sG(WJ) cMyw*,  x*> (4)
It is clear that 0(w, x) depends on w and x solely by way of U(W,  x). Intuitively,
therefore, equation (1) follows. Note that the acceptance probability equals the
probability that the random variable u(w*, x*)  exceeds U(W,  x). The probability
distribution F,(u) of u(w*,x*)  can be obtained from the distribution F(w*,x*)
of (w*,x*).  As a result,
qw, x) = 6 + AF,(u(w,  x)) (5)
in which F = 1 - F.  From this, equation (1) immediately follows5
2.2 Generalizations of the basic model
We now examine to what extent the result in equation (1) is robust with respect
to some rather unrealistic assumptions of the on-the-job search model.
2.2.1 Endogenous search intensity
Suppose individuals can influence the intensity at which offers arrive (see Morten-
sen, 1986, and Albrecht, Holmlund and Lang, 1991, for models with endogenous
search intensities in case of single job characteristic). Given a particular search
effort (or intensity) s, offers of new jobs arrive according to a Poisson process
with arrival rate Xs. The individual is able to choose s, and if s > 0 then he pays
a flow of search costs c(s), with c(s) twice differentiable, increasing and convex
in s. The instantaneous utility flow equals U(W  - c(s), x) in case one works in a
job with characteristics w, x and in case the search intensity equals s. Note that
we assume search costs to be monetary, i.e. to be paid out of the wage. This
assumption will play a crucial role.
‘A method of proving with wider applicability works by noting that, under regularity con-
ditions, the derivative of 8 with respect to w equals the derivative of 0 w.r.t. the bounds of the
set G times the derivative of these bounds w.r.t. w. Similarly for z.
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In this model version, the set of acceptable job offers is
G(w,x)  = {w*,  x*p(W*,x*)  > R(w,x)}
Note that G(w, x) depends on w, x by way of R(w,  x). This set is not necessarily
equal to the set G(w,x)  defined in (3). For example, if w and x in U(W,  x) are
not perfectly substitutable and if ~(1,  0) = ~(0,l)  then a job with characteristics
(w,x)  = (1,O)  . p f blis re era e over a job with characteristics (w, x) = (0,l)  because
in the former case s (and therefore the job offer arrival rate Xs) can be higher.
In the model, a higher wage income can be allocated towards search activities,
whereas a better value of x (a lower commuting distance) cannot. (Note that this
assumption could be relaxed somewhat.)
In case of an interior solution for the optimal search intensity s(w, x), the latter
follows from differentiation of the equivalent of equation (2) (see the references
above). Let 2~~ denote the derivative of u with respect to its first argument. We
have
ul(w - c(s(w,  x)),  x) - c’(s(w, 2)) = X  Jaw  J,w  max{O, R(w*, x*) - R(w,  a;)}  dF(w*,  x*)
The exit rate 8(w, x) now equals
qw,x>  = 6+X-s(w,x) sE(w,l) dF(w*,  x*>
Clearly, in general, s( w,  x) does not depend on w, x only by way of U(W,  x) ,
and, therefore, neither does e(w,x).  This is due to the fact that in general
pi (w - c(s) ,x) does not depend on w, x by way of U(W,X)  (take e.g. a Cobb-
Douglas specification for u). Note that Gronberg and Reed (1994) erroneously
state that (1) does hold if search intensity is endogenous.
Now let us make the simplifying assumption that preferences are additive
and linear in w and x (so U(W,  x) can be written as w + ax). This means that
w and x are perfect substitutes; x is like money. From the perspective of a job
searcher, search costs can now be paid as effectively out of w as out of x. It is
not difficult to see that, as a result, the set of acceptable job offers is as in (3).
Moreover, ui is a constant. Because of this, both s(w,x) and ~(w,x)  depend on
w, x solely by way of U(W,  x), and the model can be rewritten as a model with
a single job characteristic u. As a result, (1) does hold. Note that Gronberg and
Reed (1994) take a nonlinear specification for U(W,  x) in their empirical model,
so their results are only valid under the interpretation that search intensity is
exogenously determined.
2.2.2 Business cycles
Suppose that the business cycle affects the current values of the structural de-
terminants X  and F but not the current values of w or x of a given worker.
(Burgess, 1989, presents such a model in case of a single job characteristic.)
This model is nonstationary in the sense that the expected present utility value
R(w,  z) now varies over calendar time. However, it is not difficult to see that the
optimal strategy is still myopic (and stationary): a job offer (w*,  x”) is acceptable
if and only if the instantaneous utility flow u(w*, x*)  associated with it exceeds
the reservation utility level. By accepting an offer, nothing changes except for the
increase in the instantaneous utility flow. In particular, the search environment
in the new job and the way it changes over the business cycle are exactly the
same as in the old job. As a result, equation (1) is still valid.
Note that it does not matter whether the individual anticipates the business
cycle effects or not, as long as this does not change over time. Also note that
the model in which F varies over calendar time is formally equivalent to a model
in which general human capital is accumulated but the rents of it can only be
extracted by the worker in case a new job is accepted.
In the model considered here, X  and/or F vary over time. As a result, the job
exit rate is duration dependent, which means that O(w,  z) depends on the elapsed
job duration t. However, obviously, the ratios in the equality (1) do not depend
on t.
2.2.3 Limited maximum number of transitions
The basic on-the-job search model does not impose an upper bound on the num-
ber of job-to-job transitions by a worker in any given time interval. Consider the
opposite situation in which an employed worker can change jobs at most once.
This model resembles the standard job search model for unemployed workers
(Mortensen, 1986),  since in the latter model it is assumed that a job is kept
forever, so an unemployed individual can only make one transition.
In our case the employed worker with a job (w, x) accepts a job offer (w*,  xc”)
if and only if the instantaneous utility u(w*, x*)  of the offered job exceeds (p  +
S)R(w, x) - SU  (this follows from a comparison of the present value of accepting
the job offer and the present value R(w,  x) of continuing search). The latter
quantity is the reservation utility level <( u w,x))( associated with a job (w,x).
Let F,(U)  denote the probability distribution of u(w*, xc’). The job exit rate can
then be expressed as S + xF,(c(u(w,  x))) (note the analogy to equation (5)). As
a result, equation (1) is still valid.
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2.2.4 Transaction costs
Suppose that, every time one moves from one job to another, an amount of money
c has to be paid instantaneously. Hey and McKenna  (1979) and Van den Berg
(1992) analyze on-the-job search models with such “transaction costs”, under the
assumptions that jobs are fully characterized by wages and individuals are risk-
neutral. In order to maintain stationarity we assume that c does not depend on
the time spent in the present job nor on events during the stay in the present
job.
In this model it is not optimal to accept every job offer with a higher instant-
aneous utility flow. Because of the costs to be paid at every transition, there is
an incentive to reduce the number of transitions, i.e. to be more selective with
respect to job offers (see the references above).
In case of risk-aversion, it is difficult to analyze such a model. The transaction
costs have to be paid out of savings, so it is necessary to include an asset equation
to the model. However, intuitively it is clear that the equality (1) fails to hold
here in general. Basically, a higher wage is more attractive than a better value of
x, because the transaction costs have to be paid out of future wages.
If preferences are additive and linear in w and x then payment of c can
be thought of as coming out of a sufficiently large amount of given wealth. In
addition, analogously to the model in Subsection 2.2.1 with additive and linear
preferences, x is now like money, and transaction costs can be paid as effectively
out of w as out of x. Indeed, O(w,  2) now depends on w, x solely by way of U(W,  x),
and the model can be rewritten as a model with a single job characteristic u. As
a result, (1) does hold.
2.2.5 Other extensions
Together, the sub-subsections above provide the following insight. If (i)  the in-
stantaneous utility function is not additive and linear in w and x, while (ii) the
search environment is not symmetric in w and x in the sense that having a high w
is more useful for further search than having a good value of x, then the equality
(1) fails. Basically, in such cases, it is more beneficial to have a high wage, since
part of that wage can be dedicated to improved search relatively easily.
This insight is confirmed by examining other model extensions. Sometimes
however the asymmetry in search environment is so strong that additivity of the
utility function does not help. Consider a model in which, in addition to job offers,
there are also offers of just x, arriving according to a second Poisson process. Such
a model has some relevance in case x denotes the commuting distance, since a
worker in a given job with a given w may from time to time have the opportunity
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to move his residence towards a location that is closer to his work (in reality, he
may of course also move for other reasons). In this model, the search environment
is not symmetric in w and x: it is easier to search for x than for w. In such a
case a job with a high wage and a high commuting distance is more attractive
than a job with a low wage and low commuting distance, because it is relatively
easy to improve after a while on a high commuting distance. A worker may thus
even accept a job offer with a somewhat lower instantaneous utility flow, if such
a job is characterized by a high wage and a high commuting distance. Note that
the value of x need not be constant within a job spell in this model. This further
complicates attempts to proceed along the lines of Subsection 2.1 here.6
The model above suggests that the method of Subsection 2.1 for making
inferences on the willingness to pay for commuting distance is sensitive to the
assumption that workers do not move their residence somewhere within a job
spell. This method may therefore be best suited to study job mobility of workers
for which the latter assumption is likely to hold, such as members of settled
households, as opposed to single-living schoolleavers.
2.3 A general model framework
In this subsection we provide a general on-the-job search model framework that
incorporates some of the generalizations of Subsection 2.2 as well as some other
generalizations. We show that equation (1) holds in general, and we consider the
effects of the current values of w and x on the expected present value.
Consider the model of Subsection 2.1, with the modification that here we do
not make any assumption on the search environment after the first job-to-job
transition that will be made. Denote the expected present value of moving to a
job with characteristics w*,  x* by @w*, x*). We do not restrict the shape of 2 as
a function of w*,  x*.  A job offer is acceptable if and only if @w*,  x*)  > R(w,  x).
Let G(w,x)  denote the set of acceptable job offers, i.e.
qw,  x) = {w*, x*[R(w*,  x*> > R(w, x)}
Note that G( w, z) depends on w,x by way of R(w,x). The job exit rate O(w,x)
is still described by
qw,x>  =6+XJS(w,s) dF(w*,  x*>
60ther  examples for which (1) fails to hold concern models in which the current value of z
affects the wage offer distribution F(w*,x*)  or the job offer arrival rate A.
1 0
although the definition of 4 is different from the definition in equation (4). Fur-
thermore, the expected present value R(w,  Z) of being in a job with characteristics
w , x satisfies
pR(w,  x) = u(w, x) +A /
S(w,z)
ii(w*,  x*)  -  R(w,  x) dF(w*,  x*)  +6(U - R(w,  z)) (6)
It is useful to examine which of the models of the previous subsections are
special cases of the present model. First of all, the basic model of Subsection 2.1
is a special case of the current model (take E E R). Secondly, the models with
endogenous search intensities can not be rewritten as the current model. The
same is true for the nonstationary model with business cycle effects. However, it
is straightforward to include general nonstationarity in the model of this sub-
section. In that case, the derivatives of O(w,x) with respect to w or x may
depend on the elapsed job duration. The model with one possible job-to-job
transition can be rewritten in terms of the model of this subsection, by taking
ii(w*,  x*)  = (u(w*, x*)  + SU)/(p  + 6). T he model with transaction costs and an
additive linear utility function can also be rewritten as the current model, by
taking ?i(w*,x*)  = R(w*,  x*)  -  c. Models in which the job offer arrival rate or
the wage offer distribution are different during the next job are also special cases
of the current model.
The function O(w,  x) depends on w and x solely by way of R(w,  a;). Therefore,
under regularity conditions, by analogy with the derivations in Subsection 2.1 it
follows that
aqw,  x)/ax qw,  x)/8x
aqw,  x)/dw = aqw,  xyaw (7)
Moreover, by differentiation of equation (6) with respect to w and with respect
to x it follows that
dR(w, x)/ax &L(w, x)/ax
dR(w, x)/aw = du(w, x)/dw
By combining equations (7) and (8) it follows that equation (1) holds under quite
general conditions. The left-hand side of (8) compares the relative importance of
the current values of w and x for the expected lifetime utility. This term could
be called the lifetime MWP, whereas the right-hand side of (8) could be called
the instantaneous AOVP.  Interestingly, these two MWP measures have the same
value, so the distinction between “instantaneous” and “lifetime” is irrelevant.
We conclude Section 2 by summarizing the main results. First, the equality
(1) holds in more general settings than just the basic on-the-job search model.
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Secondly, there are also model extensions for which (1) fails in general. However,
if utility is additive and linear in the two job attributes then (1) does hold in a
number of these extensions. So, it appears that in this respect there is a trade-off
between assumptions on the search environment and assumptions on the utility
function. Thirdly, in general, the relative importance of the two attributes for
lifetime utility is equal to the relative importance in the instantaneous utility
flow, and therefore the ratio of derivatives of the job exit rate with respect to
the two attributes also captures the relative importance of these attributes for
lifetime utility.
3 The empirical analysis
3.1 The data
In the empirical analysis we use data from the so-called Telepanel dataset.  This
is a survey held among households in The Netherlands. For our purposes, the
main advantage of this dataset  is that it contains information on the location
of the workplace and the residence, and thus, by implication, on the commuting
distance. Since the dataset  has been described elsewhere numerous times and in
great detail (see Van Ommeren, 1996, for an overview), the current exposition
will be very brief. We use data that were collected in 1992-1993. These contain
extensive retrospective information on the life course history of the respondents,
notably concerning the histories of labor market behavior and the behavior con-
cerning the residence, and the changes in household composition. In particular,
the data record the starting and ending dates of the spells spent in different
labor market states (notably unemployment and employment; job-to-job trans-
itions within a spell of employment are recorded as well). The data thus enable
observation of the durations spent in these states (including job durations). In
addition, for each job, a number of job characteristics are recorded. The data on
job exits allow for a distinction between voluntary quits and involuntary lay-offs.
We select the male respondents who (i) worked for more than 20 hours per
week on January 1, for at least one of the years 1985-1991, and (ii) for which
all relevant variables (job duration, wage, commuting distance, and other back-
ground characteristics) are observed. This results in a sample of 370 individuals.
From this sample, 318 individuals work for more than 20 hours per week at the
first annual inspection point (January 1985). The other 52 individuals flow into
such a job at a later moment. Among the 318 individuals, the mean elapsed job
duration in January 1985 equals 4.6 years. In total, we observe 636 job spells in
our sample. Of these, 270 end in a transition to another job. The remaining are
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either right-censored or end in a transition out of employment.
We observe the municipalities of the residence and the workplace of the worker
(more detailed information on commuting distance or commuting time is absent),
and we use distance between the center of the municipalities as our commuting
distance variable. This variable under-estimates the real distance in case one
lives and works at the same municipality. It is likely to over-estimate the distance
in the other case, as workers can be expected to self-select such that they live
and work in those parts of the municipalities that face each other. The empir-
ical reduced-form job-duration model that we estimate below includes a range
of other explanatory variables. These represent job-, worker-, and labor market
characteristics. Specifically, we include age (in classes), size of branch, number of
subordinates, civil servant, on payroll, full-time employed, sector (construction),
and educational level (university, polytechnic, vocational, high school, lower voca-
tional). The time-varying variables are allowed to change yearly. Biannual dummy
variables are incorporated to capture changes in general labor market conditions.
Table 1 lists the sample means of all explanatory variables included in the em-
pirical model.
3.2 The empirical model specification and the likelihood
function
Recall that we aim to estimate (%/&~)/(c%/&u),  i.e. the ratio of the marginal
effects of commuting distance x and the wage 20  on the job exit rate 8.  We assume
that the way in which the job-to-job transition rate depends on its determinants
can be captured by a Mixed Proportional Hazard model (Lancaster, 1990). In
this model we assume a constant baseline hazard. Hence, we exclude autonomous
duration dependence, in line with most of the theoretical models of Section 2. For
the individual job exit rate 0 this means that we can write (in notation explained
below),
0 = 6 + exp(P’z)  . 21
where z is a vector with the explanatory variables, ,0  is a vector of unknown
parameters, and ZI  is an unobserved variable capturing unobserved worker-specific
heterogeneity. Obviously, the wage w and commuting distance x are included in Z.
We assume that v is independent of Z.  Inclusion in the model of unobserved het-
erogeneity is necessary to avoid inconsistent estimation of ,0  (see e.g. Lancaster,
1990).
In line with the literature, we use the log wage as a regressor in Z.  In fact, we
investigated the functional forms of the effects of w and x on the exit rate to other
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jobs by estimating separate models with linear and log-linear transformations. It
turns out that for the wage, a log-linear transformation fits the data better than a
linear transformation. With respect to commuting distance, there is no significant
difference between the two specifications. The results below are based on a linear
specification.
Let Pi denote the element of ,0  corresponding to variable i. In particular, plogw
denotes the coefficient of logw. The MWP for x equals
MWP(x)  = fi. w (9)
logw
Recall that the data are informative on the destination state upon job exit.
Under the maintained assumption that v does not affect 6, the estimation of the
job-to-job transition rate can be performed separately from the estimation of 6.
Spells ending in a transition to unemployment are then treated as right-censored
observations of the duration until a job-to-job transition (Lancaster, 1990). One
may be tempted to think that the parameter S is allowed to depend on z, by
analogy to the standard result in duration analysis that the moment of right-
censoring is allowed to depend on observable conditioning variables. However, if
6 depends on w or x then the search-theoretical predictions from Section 2 on the
effects of w and x on the job-to-job transition rate may be violated. Note that
this remark is of importance for any empirical analysis of job-to-job transitions.
We assume that the distribution of v is discrete. Initially we assume that
v has two mass points. We denote these mass points by z1i  and u2, and their
probabilities in the inflow into jobs by p,  and p,,  respectively. This distribution
is flexible and attractive from a computational point of view.
We estimate the model by Maximum Likelihood. Consider the available in-
formation on job durations. As noted in the previous subsection, some individuals
have an ongoing job spell on January 1, 1985, whereas others flow into a job af-
terwards. In both cases, we may observe multiple job spells for a given individual.
We include such multiple job spells in the analysis for the reason that they in-
crease the sample size of job spells, and in particular because, as is well known,
the model estimates are less sensitive to the proportionality assumption of the
job-to-job transition rate than if only single spells are used (see Honor-e, 1993).
Basically, this exploits the assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity term 21
is constant across jobs. However, it should be noted in advance that estimation
without the use of these spells does not affect the results in any important way.
Now consider the derivation of the individual likelihood contributions. We
start with the individuals who have an ongoing job spell on January 1, 1985.
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Derivation of the distribution of the length of this spell (conditional on the char-
acteristics of the job) is not straightforward. For example, in a very general set-
ting, this distribution may depend on the distribution of the job characteristics
(including w and z) across jobs, and on the way in which the distribution of
acceptable values of such characteristics changes over consecutive jobs.7  To keep
the analysis manageable, we proceed in a rather ad-hoc way. First of all, we con-
dition on the elapsed job duration p at the moment of sampling. If instead we
would have used the unconditional job duration t as an endogenous variable, then
we would have to make a number of strong untestable assumptions on the inflow
rate into jobs before the sampling moment, and the results would depend on this
(see e.g. Heckman  and Singer, 1984, and Ridder, 1984). The population distribu-
tion of the job duration until exit into another job given z and 21  is exponential,
with parameter exp(,f?‘z)v.  Let g(tlz,v) and c(tlz,~)  denote the corresponding
population density and survival function, respectively. Under some assumptions,
the density h of tip, z equals
where the expectations are taken with respect to the distribution of v in the
population. The expression above takes account of the “length-biased sampling”
phenomenon (see e.g. Ridder, 1984): the distribution of durations of ongoing spells
dominates the population duration distribution. Moreover, individuals with small
v have on average longer t.
If this ongoing spell is the only spell for this individual in the data then the
likelihood contribution is equal to h(tlp, ) bz a ove. Modification in case of right-
censoring is straightforward. Now suppose that we observe n + 1 job spells for an
individual. It is not difficult to show that the likelihood contribution then equals
where the index oft and z denotes the chronological-ordering number of the spell.
Again, modification in case of right-censoring of a job duration is straightforward.
Now consider an individual whose first job spell starts after January 1985.
Under weak conditions, the duration distribution for such a job spell is equal
7This  can be seen by interpreting the job spells as outcomes of a stationary stochastic
decision process with unobserved heterogeneity, incorporating the workers’ optimal strategy.
For example, for a given individual, the values of w and w at a given date may be related
because individuals with high v move on quickly to jobs with a high w.
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to the population distribution of job durations. If we observe multiple job spells
for this individual then the likelihood contribution simply equals the expectation
over ‘u  of the product of g(tj(zj,v).
During the period of observation, the values of the explanatory variables z
may change for a given individual. To the extent that such changes correspond
to job changes, the model specification and the likelihood above take account
of them. However, the values of z can also change within a job spell. One may
question whether such changes should be included in the empirical model. On the
one hand, they may constitute a potentially important empirical determinant of
job exit behavior. On the other hand, allowing z to vary over time would mean
that the empirical model is not in full agreement to the basic theoretical model
anymore (recall that the job exit rate in the latter model is constant over time).
However, the theoretical model extension discussed in Subsection 2.2.2 allows
for time-varying determinants of the job exit rate, and the main predictions of
the basic model remain valid under this extension. Alternatively, one may think
of changes in z as unanticipated shocks in the search environment, in which
case the main predictions remain valid as well. We therefore decide to take a
compromise stand by allowing the explanatory variables (like age group) only to
change annually. In particular, we adopt the values at January 1 for the whole
calendar year.
3.3 Estimation results
The estimates of the parameters of the job-to-job transition rate are in Table 1.
The most important estimates are those for the wage and commuting distance
effects, since these serve as inputs for the estimate of the marginal willingness to
pay for commuting. Table 1 shows significant effects for both: higher wages re-
duce the job-to-job transition rate whereas higher commuting distances increase
this rate. More specifically, the estimated quasi-elasticity of the expected dura-
tion until exit to another job with respect to commuting distance per kilometer
(/3,/100) is equal to -0.0038, and the estimated elasticity with respect to the
wage (&,w)  is equal to 1.49. The estimate of the MWP for commuting follows
from the right-hand side of equation (9). We substitute the estimated ,f?,  and
P logw, we substitute for w the average net hourly wage of 20 Dutch Guilders, and
we divide the estimate by 100 in order to obtain the willingness to pay for one
kilometer. The resulting estimate equals -0.051, with a standard deviation of
0.028.8  As a consequence, the MWP in case of a working day of 8 hours is es-
*If we allow for a third mass point in the heterogeneity distribution then the estimate
increases slightly (to 0.058). Exclusion of unobserved heterogeneity w from the model leads to
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timated to be about -0.40 Guilder per kilometer. Since the average commuting
distance is 20 kilometers, the over-all average MWP in case of a working day of
8 hours is estimated to be 8 Guilders.
The estimated MWP for commuting distance can be used to estimate an
MWP for commuting time. The annual Dutch labor force survey, called “Enqugte
Beroepsbevolking” contains information that can be used to calculate the average
traveling speed during commuting (the speed of course depends on the mode
used). According to Statistics Netherlands (1992), commuters who use the car
travel with an average speed of about 32 kilometers per hour for commutes of less
than 16 kilometers. Commuters who travel for more than 16 kilometers travel on
average twice as fast. Based on these figures, the MWP for one-hour commuting
per day (i.e., two half-hour car trips per day) is about minus one-third of the
hourly wage rate,g while the MWP for more than one hour commuting per day
(i.e., two trips per day that each take more than half an hour) is about minus
two-third of the hourly wage rate. Since the average commuting distance is 20
kilometers, the over-all average is closer to minus one-third of the wage rate than
to  minus two-third of the wage rate. These estimates are well in line with other
empirical results (see Wales, 1978, who, in the context of a labor supply model,
estimates that commuting time is on average valued at about two-third of the
hourly wage rate, and Small, 1992, who concludes from a large number of studies
that the average value of time for the journey-to-work trip is estimated to be
around 50 percent of the hourly wage rate).
Most other covariate effects are in line with those found in previous empir-
ical studies on job and residential mobility (see, for example, Lindeboom and
Theeuwes, 1991, Van den Berg, 1992, and Van Ommeren, 1996). The calendar
year effects reflect aggregate fluctuations in job mobility in the Dutch labor mar-
ket. We observe a general recovery of labor market conditions in the second half
of the eighties. Not surprisingly, older workers are less mobile than middle-aged
(34-44 years) workers. Workers in large firms are less mobile, perhaps because
there are more internal career possibilities within large firms.
It may be interesting to examine to what extent the MWP estimate is biased
if the model of Subsection 2.2.5 holds, i.e. if workers sometimes receive the oppor-
tunity to move their residence during a job spell. We know that in that model,
equation (1) does not necessarily hold, in which case the MWP is not equal to
an even higher estimate (O.OSS),  but this model gives a significantly worse fit than the model
with unobserved heterogeneity.
‘At  a speed of 32 km/hour, a commuting time of half an hour corresponds to a commuting
distance of 16 kilometers. The latter costs 16 times 0.40 Guilder (i.e. 6.4 Guilders) per day.
This is about one third of the average hourly wage of 20 Guilders.
1 7
the right-hand side of (9). Indeed, the value of x associated with a given job offer
is of less importance to the worker. As a result, the job-to-job transition rate will
be less sensitive to the current value of x, and the instantaneous MWP will be
under-estimated.
Finally, we compare our estimates with those from a conventional hedonic
wage regression. As noted in the introduction, this approach, which has been
popular in the literature, is likely to produce biased estimates of the MWP. We
simply regress the log hourly wage rate on the same set of regressors as used
above, so log w = Q’Z  + E.  The estimation results are in Table 2. Note that the
firm size has a positive effect on the wage. This is in line with the equilibrium
search models used as a motivating theoretical framework by Gronberg and Reed
(1994) and Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998). Our focus is on the estimate
for commuting distance, which is significantly positive and equal to 0.0010 per
kilometer. According to the standard compensating-wage model with perfect mar-
kets, the MWP for commuting equals -dw/dx.  Evaluated at the average hourly
wage of 20,1°  the estimated MWP is equal to about -0.02, which is less than half
of the MWP estimate based on the job duration data.
It is important to note that the ratio of the MWP estimates from the duration
model and the hedonic model (this ratio equals 2.5) is robust against the func-
tional form of the way in which the wage rate and the commuting distance enter
these models. We conclude from this that the hedonic model underestimates the
MWP for commuting.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that a recent theoretical result, which states that variation in job
durations can be exploited to estimate the willingness to pay for job attributes,
can be generalized. The theoretical result was derived in the context of a basic
on-the-job search model, and in the paper we show that a number of assumptions
of the basic model can be relaxed, and, indeed, that the result is valid in a wide
class of search models. In addition, we show that the relative importance of the
current job attributes for the expected lifetime utility is equal to the relative
importance for the instantaneous utility flow. So, for the marginal willingness to
pay, the distinction between “instantaneous” and “lifetime” is irrelevant.
In the application, we estimate a job duration model using Dutch longitud-
loThe  estimated regression coefficient equals the quasi-elasticity (dlog  w/ax),  and hence
needs to be multiplied with the average hourly wage and divided by 100 to obtain minus
the average MWP.
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inal data. The estimation results are subsequently used to estimate the marginal
willingness of employed workers to pay for commuting. The MWP in case of a
working day of 8 hours is estimated to be about -0.40 Guilder per kilometer (or
$ - 0.20 per kilometer, or $ -  0.32 per mile), per day. Since the average com-
muting distance is 20 kilometers, the over-all average MWP in case of a working
day of 8 hours is estimated to be 8 Guilders per day. These estimates can be
translated into an MWP for commuting time. It turns out that the over-all pop-
ulation average of the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction of commuting
time is almost half the hourly wage rate. This suggests that commuting is not
experienced as a complete waste of time.
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Table 1 ESTIMATES of coefficients
for voluntary job-to-job mobility ’
variablesb
fi duration model mean
value
age:
< age < 24
24 < age * 34
34 x age < 44
size of branch:
size > 200 p
20 p c size < 200 p
number of subordinates:
0
1,2,3
non government
on payroll
construction sector
more than 32 hours
InWage  ratef
educational level:
university
polytechnic
vocational
lower vocational
high school
comuting  distanced
calendar year:
1985/1986
198711988
1989/1990
0.27 (0.31) 0.08
0.44 (0.26) * 0.38
0.79 (0.27)  ** 0.31
-0.57 (0.20)  **
-0.32 (0.20)
0.39
0.33
-0.20 (0.28)
0.13 (0.19)
0.28 (0.22)
0.19 (0.25)
-0.16 (0.35)
-0.44 (0.28)
-1 .49 (0.23)  * *
0.19
0.68
0.65
0.97
0.07
0.97
2.86
0.33 (0.29)
0.21 (0.26)
-0.45 (0.31)
-0.75 (0.30) **
-0.05 (0.64)
0.38 (0.20)  *
0.10
0.16
0.23
0.26
0.07
0.20
-0.36 (0.18) ** 0.28
-0.10 (0.17) 0.29
0.00 (0.08) 0.29
unobserved heterogeneity: mass points and probabilities":
Vl 4.07 (4.19)
VZ 13.84 (4.26) **
P, 0.99 (0.01)
PZ 0.01 (0.01)
Number of observations 370
Log-likelihood -701.85
(a)
(b)
Cc)
Cd)
(e)
Standard errors in parentheses; **: significant at 5%, *: significant at 10%.
Reference groups: age (older than 44), size of branch (less than 201, number
of subordinates (more than 31,
(selfemployed),
non government (civil servant), on payroll
more than 32 hours (less than 32), construction sector
(l'others"), educational level (primary and l"others"), calendar year (1991).
Net wage (in Dutch guilders) per hour; 2 guilders is about 1 US $.
Distance in 100 kilometres.
Inclusion of more masspoints hardly changes the estimates.
Table 2
variable&
ESTMATES  of hedonic wage regression a
a wage regressiof?
constant
age:
< age < 24
24 c age < 34
34 < age < 44
size of branch:
size > 200 p
20 p < size < 200 p
number of subordinates:
0
1,2,3
non-government
on payroll
more than 32 hours
construction sector
educational level:
university
polytechnic
vocational
lower vocational
high school
c-tit-g distanced
calendar year:
1985/1986
1987/1988
1989/1990
Adjusted R* = 0.32
Number of observations = 2332"
3.33 (0.07) *
-0.55 (0.03) *
-0.27 (0.02) *
0.07 (0.02) *
0.23 (0.02) *
0.10 (0.02) l
0.08 (0.02) *
0.02 (0.02)
0.02 (0.02)
-0.13 (0.04) *
-0.36 (0.04) *
-0.14 (0.03) *
0.24 (0.03) *
0.14 (0.02) *
0.01 (0.02)
-0.07 (0.02) *
0.02 (0.03)
0.10 (0.03) *
0.01 (0.02)
-0.01 (0.02)
-0.02 (0.02)
(a)
(b)
(cl
Cd)
(e)
Standard errors in parentheses; *: significant at 5%.
Dependent variable is the logarithm of the net wage per hour (in Dutch
guilders).
Reference groups: as in Table 1.
Distance in 100 kilometres.
Each individual is included once for every year, provided he works on the
first of January in that year.
